Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 101
Issue 3 Symposium: Preventative Detention

Article 7

Summer 2011

Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventative
Detention
Corey Rayburn Yung

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventative Detention, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 969 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol101/iss3/7

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/11/10103-0969
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2011 by Northwestern University, School of Law

Vol. 101, No. 3
Printed in U.S.A.

SEX OFFENDER EXCEPTIONALISM AND
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
COREY RAYBURN YUNG *
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of his thirty-seven-month prison sentence for possessing
child pornography, Graydon Earl Comstock, Jr. expected to be released
back into society. However, the federal government had other plans. It
decided to test its newly authorized power to detain indefinitely persons
designated as “sexually dangerous” who were already in federal custody. 1
Comstock’s lawyers acted quickly to block the Government’s efforts to
essentially add a second period of incarceration to Comstock’s prison term. 2
A federal district judge held that the new statute was beyond the scope of
the Constitution’s enumerated powers and the established procedures for
determining Comstock’s future dangerousness were constitutionally
inadequate. 3
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the Government’s appeal and
unanimously affirmed the district court’s judgment concerning the scope of
federal power (while not reaching the due process question). 4 During this
entire period of time, Comstock remained in federal prison even though his
sentence was completed and not a single judge who had reviewed the case
had found the government was constitutionally authorized to detain him via
the new civil commitment statute. While the United States Attorneys
waited for the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari to hear the case,
they sought a special order from the Court. 5 The Government’s lawyers
*

Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School.
18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
2
See United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (noting that
even though Comstock’s incarceration expired on November 8, 2006, pursuant to the
government's certification of Comstock as a “sexually dangerous person,” Comstock's
release was stayed pursuant to § 4248 for the entire duration of the proceedings).
3
Id. at 559–60.
4
United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2009).
5
Sex Offenders’ Release is Blocked, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at A14 (“Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. has granted the Obama administration’s request to block the release of
certain sex offenders who have completed their federal prison terms.”).
1
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filed a motion with Chief Justice Roberts, while neither notifying the
defense lawyers nor offering them an opportunity to be present, requesting
that the Chief Justice prevent Comstock and other persons targeted for
commitment from being released from federal custody. 6 With the stroke of
a pen, Chief Justice Roberts ordered that Comstock continue to be detained
until the Court reached a decision on the certiorari petition.7
Months later, the Court decided to hear the case, 8 and all the while
Comstock remained in a federal prison cell based upon the ruling of a single
Justice who had only heard arguments from federal government attorneys
before deciding to order Comstock’s continued detention. By the time the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case upholding the civil
commitment statute, Comstock had spent approximately three and one-half
years in federal prison beyond the period for which he was sentenced. 9
When the Fourth Circuit reversed the remaining grounds identified by the
district court as constitutionally barring Comstock’s commitment to a
federal sex offender facility, Comstock had spent four years in prison for
which he had neither had a trial nor been sentenced. 10 The original
sentence for possession of child pornography for which he was imprisoned
was less than the time he served in prison pending the outcome of the
Government’s case to institutionalize him through its new civil commitment
law. Now, if the experience with similar state laws is any guide, 11

6

Lyle Denniston, Release of Sex Offenders Delayed, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2009, 5:38
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/04/release-of-sex-offenders-delayed (“The Justice
Department in the morning asked for a delay of the appeals court decision, but also sought
an ‘immediate, interim’ stay while its request was awaiting the Chief Justice’s reaction.
Roberts, without seeking a response from the challengers to the federal law, by late
afternoon issued his order fully staying the Circuit Court.”).
7
United States v. Comstock, No. 08A863 (08-1224) (U.S. Apr. 3, 2009) (ordering a stay
of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling).
8
United States v. Comstock, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009) (granting certiorari).
9
Comstock’s prison term expired in November 2006. Brief for Respondent at 2, United
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2009) (No. 08-1224) [hereinafter Respondents’ Brief].
The Court did not issue its opinion in the case until May 17, 2010. United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
10
The Fourth Circuit heard the case on expedited review, issuing its decision in
December 2010. United States v. Comstock, No. 07-7671(L), 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16976
(4th Cir. June 8, 2010) (granting expedited review); United States v. Comstock, Nos. 077671, 07-7672, 07-7673, 07-7674, 07-7675, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24830 (4th Cir. Dec. 6,
2010).
11
The number of sex offenders who have been released from civil commitment is
astonishingly low. Meaghan Kelly, Note, Lock Them Up—and Throw Away the Key: The
Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L.
551, 560 (2008) (“[V]ery few of those committed are released, thus amounting to lifetime
confinement.”).
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Comstock will likely spend the rest of his life in another government
detention facility.
Comstock’s long-term incarceration after his sentence expired is a
microcosm of the general indifference displayed to the use of preventive
detention for sex offenders. Although Comstock’s case has become wellknown for its importance in the continuing development of Court doctrine
relating to the scope of federal power,12 his individual story was virtually
omitted from coverage of the case. Indeed, in all of the opinions by the
Supreme Court Justices reviewing Comstock’s case, no Justice even
mentioned Comstock’s name or the history of his case. 13 Comstock will
likely be remembered as the man whose case shaped the doctrine that would
eventually determine the constitutionality of President Obama’s health care
reform initiative, 14 but his individual fate will not even be a footnote in that
history. And, unlike the detainees held as part of the War on Terror, the tale
of Comstock’s long term preventive detention based upon a single
government actor simply has not been a concern of the public, media,
scholars, and activists. Given the scant attention paid to Comstock, others
without the virtue of a Supreme Court case may be similarly held with no
hint of public scrutiny.
The emerging war on sex offenders, as typical of wartime mentality,
has been marked by substantial deviations from established legal doctrine,
constitutional protections, and the rule of law.15 Because of a high level of
panic among the general population about sex offenders, 16 the use of
preventive detention for sex offenders like Comstock has received little
attention or scrutiny. While the population of the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay has slowly decreased, 17 the number of persons in state
and federal detention centers dedicated to sex offenders has continued to

12
See Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle; Can Stephen Breyer Save the Obama Agenda in
the Supreme Court?, NEW YORKER, Sep. 27, 2010, at 34, 40.
13
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
14
See N.C. Aizenman, Fate of Law Probably up to High Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 14,
2010, at A9.
15
See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2010) [hereinafter War on Sex Offenders]; Corey Rayburn
Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369
(2009).
16
Michael M. O’Hear, Perpetual Panic, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 69 (2008).
17
See Charlie Savage & Andrew W. Lehren, Haggling over Guantánamo's Fate, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 30, 2010, at 2.
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With the courts largely rubberstamping the federal civil
climb. 18
commitment of sex offenders allowed under the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act (AWA) in 2006,19 the path has been cleared for
an enormous expansion of sex offender detention.20
Because of the limited attention given to these detentions, they
represent a particularly dire threat to American liberties. 21 The normal
societal and institutional checks against government abuse embodied in the
media, public, Constitution, and courts have essentially been removed.
Consequently, the various government agencies in the United States have
virtually unfettered power to preventively detain sex offenders. And
because of the expansive holdings of courts in these cases, the doctrinal
precedents being set afford governments at all levels the ability to apply
similar schemes to any vulnerable population in the United States. 22
Part II of this Article details the growing use of preventive detention of
sex offenders at the state and federal levels and the statutory structure that
has made such detentions possible. Part III places this emerging trend
within the larger concerns related to the use of preventive detention in
America. Part IV discusses how the shape of constitutional doctrines
related to preventive detention has been fundamentally altered in a way that
greatly expands the possibility of the future applications of such detention
schemes. The Article concludes with some thoughts about how sex
offender issues in this area relate to the overall topic of this symposium.

18
JOHN Q. LA FOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HOW SOCIETY SHOULD COPE WITH
SEX OFFENDERS 145 (2005) (calling the use of civil commitment for sex offenders a “growth
industry”).
19
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587.
20
See Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of Sexual
Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233 (2004); Jeslyn A. Miller, Comment, Sex Offender
Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2093, 2099–100 n.29 (2010).
21
“The political rhetoric tends to shape the problem of sexual violence in the form of the
archetypal ‘Beauty and the Beast’ story, focusing intense attention on rare but vivid crimes.
Such a narrow framing of the problem renders the huge proportion of sexual violence
relatively invisible.” Janus, supra note 20, at 1248.
22
Once the Attorney General certifies that a person within federal custody is “sexually
dangerous” under § 4248:

[T]he district court in the jurisdiction in which the federal government holds a person[]
automatically stays that person's release from prison. . . . Moreover, § 4248 empowers the
Attorney General to prolong federal detention in this manner without presenting evidence or
making any preliminary showing; the statute only requires that the certification contain an
allegation of dangerousness.

United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
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II. PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF SEX OFFENDERS
Based upon the popular, but largely incorrect, belief that sex offenders
have an abnormally high risk of recidivism, sex offenders represent an ideal
population to target for preventive detention.23 Indeed, if one believes that
it is only a matter of time before a child molester will rape another child, it
makes perfect sense to detain them indefinitely. 24 Further, if Americans
think that the prototypical child molester is lurking in the bushes waiting to
attack children, and is not a friend or family member, then focusing
criminal justice resources on those already convicted of such crimes
logically follows. These particular myths of extremely high recidivism
rates and “stranger danger” have largely served to support various
restrictions on sex offenders as well as substantiate court opinions
upholding those restrictions. 25
Americans overwhelmingly believe that sex offenders are mentally
deranged and that the risk of post-release recidivism is very high. 26 As one
church leader stated in deciding to exclude sex offenders from his
congregation: “[I]t would probably be easier for a congregation to accept a
former murderer.” 27 Courts have internalized this popular opinion in their
decisionmaking. In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court wrote that Alaska’s
registration statute helped prevent the “frightening and high” risk of
recidivism by sex offenders. 28 At the oral argument reviewing Kansas’s
sexual predator law, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemingly rejected the
longstanding model of the American criminal justice system when he
rhetorically asked, “So what’s the State supposed to do, just wait till he
goes out and does it again?” 29 The Eighth Circuit, in Doe v. Miller, relied
on the unsubstantiated finding that sex offender recidivism “is between 20
and 25 percent.” 30 The Fifth Circuit upheld special conditions on
supervised release in United States v. Emerson based upon a U.S.
probations officer’s testimony that, in his “professional experience . . . sex
offenders . . . have a recidivism rate of approximately 70%.”31

23
See ERIC JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE
RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 2–3 (2006).
24
See id.
25
Id.; see War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 453–55.
26
See, e.g., Eilene Zimmerman, Churches Slam Doors on Sex Offenders, SALON (Apr.
26, 2007), http://www.salon.com/life/feature/2007/04/26/sexoffenders_church.
27
Id.
28
538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)).
29
Transcript of Oral Argument, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 951649, 95-9075), 1996 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 80, at *41.
30
405 F.3d 700, 707 (8th Cir. 2005).
31
231 F. App’x 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2007).
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However, the best available evidence does not support those beliefs.
The Department of Justice examined the criminal records of the 9,691 sex
offenders, rapists, child molesters, statutory rapists, and those who
committed sexual assault released in fifteen states in 1994.32 The study
found that sex offender recidivism among that population was far lower
than believed and in line with other violent offenders.33 The recidivism rate
was only 5.3% for the critical first three years after release. 34 Further, the
study found that the sex offender recidivism rate was almost 37% less than
the non-sex offender population for all crimes during that same time
frame. 35 The Bureau of Justice Statistics has found that sex offenders, as a
group, have among the lowest recidivism rates of the various criminal
populations studied. 36 The general recidivism studies should be understood
with a significant caveat: because of underreporting, it is difficult to know
the validity of these studies simply because a record of reoffense may never
be created. 37 However, studies that focus on comparisons between stranger
and known offenders do not suffer from the same deficiency.
Among those studies, a clear pattern emerges that the inordinate focus
on past offenders is misguided. Although the fear of strangers has been the
hallmark of sex offenders, 90% of child molestations are committed by
family members or acquaintances and friends of the family. 38 As Eric Janus
has noted, “Sexual predators are rare, atypical sex offenders. But because of
the intense focus of the media . . . , predators have become archetypical.” 39
As a result, the myth of incurable predators has been at the center of efforts
to divert sex offender facilities for “treatment” at the state and federal
levels.
A. STATE CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTES

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, triggered by high-profile, horrific
sex crimes, Washington and Minnesota enacted laws to allow for civil

32

LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN
1994, at 2 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 24.
35
Id. at 2.
36
See Dwight H. Merriam, Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders: A Failure of Public
Policy, 60 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 4 (2008).
37
Kirk Heilbrun et al., The Science of Sex Offenders: Risk Assessment, Treatment, and
Prevention, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 138, 139–140 (1998).
38
See Ellen Perlman, Where Will Sex Offenders Live?, GOVERNING MAG., June 2006, at
56, available at http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/Sex-OffendersLive.html.
39
JANUS, supra note 23, at 3.
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commitment of sex offenders after their release from prison.40 These laws
designated committed persons as “sexually violent predators” (SVPs) with
strong public support. 41 Thus began a slow trend toward greater restrictions
on sex offenders after they had served their sentences. Along with
registration requirements and residency restrictions, SVP laws provided a
range of options for states to control sex offenders after their release from
prison. 42
This was not the first time, however, that American governments used
psychiatric facilities to detain sex offenders. In the late 1930s, a variety of
“sex psychopath laws” were implemented to detain sex offenders deemed
incurable or unfit for criminal punishment.43 In 1940, in Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Prob. Ct. of Ramsey County, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of one of these laws against equal protection and due
process challenges. 44 In 1966, the Supreme Court, in Baxstrom v. Herold,
articulated a significant distinction that would shape the future of civil
commitment laws. 45 The Court recognized that the purposes of civil
commitment were not punitive in nature. 46 However, by the late 1970s, it
had become painfully clear that the civil commitment of so-called sex
psychopaths had been an abject failure from a policy perspective. 47 And
most of the states that had laws enabling these programs soon eliminated
them. 48
With seemingly no regard to the past, states simply enacted new
versions of the sex psychopath laws throughout the 1990s in response to
public panic regarding sex offenders. 49 Presently, at least twenty states
have enacted SVP laws that allow sex offenders to be sent to detention
40

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 2008); JANUS, supra note 23, at 14–15.
See Tom Prettyman, Federal And State Constitutional Law Challenges to State Sex
Offender Laws, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1080–81 (1998); ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST.
FOR PUB. POLICY, WASHINGTON'S SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAW: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
AND COMPARISONS WITH OTHER STATES 1 (1996), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/
rptfiles/WAsexlaw.pdf.
42
See War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 447–53.
43
JANUS, supra note 23, at 22.
44
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Ct. of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S. 270, 277 (1940).
45
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
46
Id. at 111–12, 114.
47
Civil commitment had proven to be an extremely costly system, prone to abuse, with
no actual success in treatment. JANUS, supra note 23, at 22; Rudolph Alexander, Jr., The
United States Supreme Court and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 84 PRISON J. 361,
363 (2004).
48
JANUS, supra note 23, at 22; Andrew J. Harris, The Civil Commitment of Sexual
Predators: A Policy Review, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS
339, 343 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2009).
49
JANUS, supra note 23, at 22.
41
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facilities for “treatment” after release from prison. 50 Placement within the
sex offender centers will often amount to a lifetime sentence after the
offender was released from prison. 51 Procedures for commitment to these
facilities vary widely. 52 Many states require that an offender have his or her
own psychiatrist expert and be represented by legal counsel.53 Whereas
some states require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements needed
for institutionalization, a minority only necessitate that the Government
show by clear and convincing evidence the facts related to dangerousness.54
Some states require periodic court review of a person’s case to determine if
there is continuing dangerousness while others rely solely on a doctor’s
determination with no scheduled windows for review.55
Notably, none of these institutionalization schemes have exclusively
relied on an offender’s prior convictions (doing so would surely cause
constitutional problems) and instead have used past behavior to predict the
future dangerousness that is the basis for detention. 56 Indeed, it was the
distinction between stopping future harm versus punishing for past conduct
that was the touchstone for the Supreme Court in upholding Kansas’s
commitment statute in Kansas v. Hendricks. 57
In many ways, Hendricks was the ideal test case from the
Government’s perspective. The petitioner’s brief before the Supreme Court
outlined why Leroy Hendricks was the perfect person for the Government
to contend that he belonged in potentially lifetime civil detention:
[Hendricks] testified [in 1994] that . . . his history of sexual involvement with children
began in 1955—he was 20—when he exposed his genitals to two young girls . . . . In
1957, Hendricks was convicted of lewdness for playing strip poker with a 14-year-old
girl, and in 1960, while working for a carnival, he molested two young boys—ages 7
and 8—by fondling their genitals.

50

Kelly, supra note 11, at 552–53 (“Today 20 states have SVP laws, providing for the
indefinite detention of about 2,700 offenders.”). Among the states that have SVP laws are:
Washington, Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, New Jersey, California, Texas, Arizona,
Illinois, North Dakota, Missouri, Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, New York, New Hampshire, and Nebraska. Harris, supra note 48, at 371 n.ii.
51
Kelly, supra note 11, at 560. One study indicated that civil commitment of sex
offenders amounts to a life sentence in approximately 90% of cases. See KATHY GOOKIN,
WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED
(2007), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf.
52
See Harris, supra note 48, at 350–57.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See Miller, supra note 20, at 2110–11.
57
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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After three years of imprisonment, Hendricks was paroled and then promptly arrested,
convicted and imprisoned for molesting a seven-year-old girl by placing his fingers in
her vagina . . . . Hendricks testified that he understood his behavior was wrong, but
that he was unable to control himself. As a result of his molestation of this girl,
Hendricks was adjudicated a sexual psychopath under Washington law and civilly
committed to a mental institution for treatment until 1965, when he was released. In
1967, Hendricks was again convicted and imprisoned for molesting another young
boy and girl. Hendricks had repeatedly performed oral sex on the 8-year-old girl and
fondled the 11-year-old boy over a period of two months. Again, Hendricks stated
that he committed these crimes because he had an urge to do so which he did not even
try to control. After being released from prison in 1972 . . . . Hendricks began a
prolonged period of molesting his own stepdaughter and stepson. He testified that he
knew his behavior was a problem, but that he did not cease it or seek treatment.
Hendricks’ stepdaughter testified that Hendricks performed oral sex on her several
times a month from the time she was approximately 9 until she was 14 . . . .
Hendricks’ stepson also testified that Hendricks performed oral sex on him and
fondled his genitals approximately once a week from the time the stepson was about 9
until he was 14. The stepson further testified that Hendricks also made him perform
oral sex on Hendricks. . . .
Hendricks’ most recent conviction was in 1984 for the molestation of two 13-year-old
boys, resulting in his serving ten years in prison before his scheduled release in 1994.
At the time of these offenses, Hendricks told a police detective that he could not
control his urge to touch the boys’ penises. Hendricks testified that he had spent half
his life since 1955 in prison or in psychiatric institutions. He further testified that
when he suffers stress, he is unable to control the urge to engage in sexual activity
58
with a child, declaring that “I can’t control the urge when I get stressed out.”

With such a horrific record and a complete failure of the criminal
justice system to properly punish and deter Hendricks, he seemed perfectly
fitted for the SVP law. Hendricks concluded his testimony by noting that
treatment was “bullshit” and when asked how he could be stopped from
molesting more children if released, he said that “the only way to guarantee
that is to die.” 59 If preventive detention for sex offenders were limited to
the Leroy Hendrickses of the world, there would not be much ground to
object against the use of civil commitment in this area.
Ultimately, in Hendricks’s case, the Supreme Court held that, because
these facilities were civil and not punitive in nature or effects, constitutional
protections related to double jeopardy, due process, and ex post facto
punishment were not implicated by the Kansas SVP law. 60 Similarly, the
strong bias in certain constitutional doctrines against punishing persons
solely for their status was overruled by the desire to prevent future sex

58

Brief for Petitioner at 8–10, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649)
(internal citations omitted).
59
Id. at 11.
60
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
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crimes. 61 While the number of states with SVP programs constitute a
minority due to economic realities, block grants given as part of the AWA
are likely to increase the number in the future.62 In addition to block grants,
the AWA established the first federal SVP program. 63
B. THE ADAM WALSH ACT

In 2006, coinciding with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the abduction
of Adam Walsh, President Bush signed into law the AWA. 64 The statute
contained a plethora of new restrictions, sentences, and requirements for sex
offenders. 65 Included among the hodge-podge of new federal initiatives 66
was Title III § 302 of the Act, which established the Jimmy Ryce Civil
Commitment Program. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4248, the program
authorized federal authorities to divert someone to a sex offender detention
facility if: (1) he or she was “in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons”; 67 (2)
“the Attorney General or any individual authorized by the Attorney General
or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [certified] that the person is a
sexually dangerous person”; and (3) “after the hearing, the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous
person.” 68 To prove that a person was “sexually dangerous,” the
Government needed to show that “a person [had] engaged or attempted to
engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and . . . suffers from
a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he
would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or
child molestation if released.” 69
The process by which a person would be committed followed many
states, but there were significant differences in the federal law. The
procedure to commit a person in custody begins with a decision by the

61

See JANUS, supra note 23, at 19–20.
See John Matthew Fabian, To Catch a Predator, and Then Commit Him for Life:
Analyzing the Adam Walsh Act’s Civil Commitment Scheme Under 18 U.S.C. § 4248,
CHAMPION, Feb. 2009, at 44, 45.
63
See War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 450–51.
64
Kris Axtman, Efforts Grow to Keep Tabs on Sex Offenders, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 28, 2006, at 1.
65
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587.
66
See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-7.html.
67
18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006).
68
Id. § 4248(d).
69
Id. § 4247(a)(5)–(6).
62
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Bureau of Prisons to designate that person as “sexually dangerous.” 70
There is no subsequent requirement that the Attorney General make a
preliminary showing as to the applicability of the certification procedures—
the allegation alone is sufficient. 71
At that time, the person designated as “sexually dangerous” will not be
released from custody until the completion of civil commitment
proceedings. 72 Once that stay is automatically issued, the designated person
will be held indefinitely and there is no requirement that civil commitment
proceedings or related litigation occur in a timely fashion. And the stay is
not based upon anything other than a Bureau of Prisons finding and there
are no means for the designated person to contest the designation until the
formal civil commitment hearing. 73
Once the hearing is held, the Government must prove the elements
described above by a standard of clear and convincing evidence.74 The
designated person has rights to counsel, cross-examine witnesses, testify,
and subpoena witnesses on his or her behalf. 75 However, among the many
rights that are not guaranteed are the following: (1) to remain silent; (2) to a
jury trial; (3) to discovery; (4) to procedural rights at the hearing analogous
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; (5) to a speedy trial; and (6) to
bail while awaiting any stage to proceed. 76 If the Government meets its
burden of proof, then the designated person is committed to the custody of
the Attorney General. The Attorney General will then order the person to a
federal sex offender facility unless a state assumes responsibility for the
designated person. 77
After being committed to a federal institution, the sexually dangerous
person will be subject to periodic review by the facility director until such
time as the director believes the person no longer poses a substantial
threat. 78 If the facility director makes such a finding then a certificate will
70

Id. § 4248(a).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4248(a), (d).
72
Id. § 4248(a) (“A certificate filed under this subsection shall stay the release of the
person pending completion of procedures contained in this section.”).
73
See U.S. v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317 , 332–333 (D. Mass. 2007).
74
18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(d), 4248(a), (d).
75
Id. § 4247(d) (“At a hearing ordered pursuant to this chapter the person whose mental
condition is the subject of the hearing shall be represented by counsel and, if he is financially
unable to obtain adequate representation, counsel shall be appointed for him pursuant to
section 3006A. The person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present evidence,
to subpoena witnesses on his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who
appear at the hearing.”).
76
Fabian, supra note 62, at 46.
77
18 U.S.C. § 4248(d).
78
Id. § 4247(e).
71
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be issued allowing for a new court hearing. 79 At this hearing, the burden of
proof is on the sexually dangerous person to show he or she is “cured” of
the illness that created a “serious risk” of committing a sex offense. 80
Because these are the same procedures used for a person awaiting trial but
deemed mentally incompetent (and not specific to sex offender
commitment), there have been no articulated criteria for how a committed
person would make such a showing.
III. UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF SEX OFFENDER PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Although all instances of preventive detention share certain common
aspects, there are definite differences as well. In the case of sex offenders,
there are elements of medical and actuarial science that buttress the
authority for these new programs. Also, the processes by which an offender
is detained and released vary substantially. Further, the lack of social and
institutional constraints on government action related to sex offenders
makes their situation relatively unique among forms of preventive detention
in recent American history. Each of the unusual aspects related to the new
sex offender facilities is discussed below.
A. PSEUDO-SCIENCE

Unlike other modern instances of preventive detention in America,
SVP laws have relied on medical authority to administer and support the
enacted programs. For example, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 4248 and
related provisions appear to incorporate a strong foundation built upon
psychiatric understanding of sex offender behavior. In order for a person to
be committed, a psychological evaluation must be issued meeting the
following criteria:
A psychiatric or psychological report . . . shall be prepared by the examiner
designated to conduct the psychiatric or psychological examination and . . . shall
include—
(1) the person’s history and present symptoms;
(2) a description of the psychiatric, psychological, and medical tests that were
employed and their results;
(3) the examiner’s findings; and
(4) the examiner’s opinions as to diagnosis, prognosis, and . . . whether the person
81
is a sexually dangerous person.

79
80
81

Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e).
Id. § 4247(c).
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However, a closer look at the law and the diagnostic techniques used
to determine the dangerousness of persons subject to institutionalization
reveals a very different picture.
One of the most significant problems with § 4248 concerns the
“serious risk” that a person will not be able to suppress their urges to
commit a qualifying sexual offense. While every state statute included a
showing that the defendant would “likely” recidivate, the AWA SVP law
only needs proof as to a “serious risk.” 82 It is possible that courts will
construe the “serious risk” to mean “likely,” but it is also possible that a
view that affords even greater government latitude will take hold. 83 As Dr.
John Matthew Fabian has recognized, the language of “serious risk” implies
a volitional impairment in judgment. 84 If that is the case, then the diagnosis
of many related mental illnesses required by the statute may meet this
element as well because volitional impairment is often a symptom of such
conditions.
Unfortunately, the social science in the area is so underdeveloped that
regardless of the definition used by courts, the ability to predict future
dangerousness of particular sex offenders is rudimentary at best. The only
objective tool for determining the future recidivism risk for sex offenders is
called STATIC-99. The ten question diagnostic assessment relies on
actuarial data to identify if an offender is a low, low-moderate, moderatehigh, or high risk. The ten questions are straightforward:
Aged 25 or older . . . .
Ever lived with lover for at least two years . . . .
Index non-sexual violence—Any Convictions . . . .
Prior non-sexual violence—Any Convictions . . . .
Prior Sex Offences . . . .
Prior sentencing dates (excluding index) . . . .
Any convictions for non-contact sex offences . . . .
Any Unrelated Victims . . . .
Any Stranger Victims . . . .
Any Male Victims . . . .

82

85

See Fabian, supra note 62, at 48.
See id.
84
Id.
85
KARL HANSON & DAVID THORNTON, STATIC-99 CODING FORM, available at
http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/static-99-coding-rules_e71.pdf.
83
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The answers to each of those questions are linked with a variety of
scores which either add or subtract from a person’s risk index number. If
an offender scores 1 or below, they are a low risk, 2 or 3, low-moderate
risk, 4 or 5, moderate-high risk, and 6 and above, high risk. 86 It is not
difficult for an offender to find himself classified in the moderate-high or
high risk categories.
For example, if an offender is a nineteen-year-old gay man convicted
of a low-degree sexual assault because he grabbed another man’s buttocks
without consent, the offender will likely score a 5 placing him at the upper
end of the moderate-high risk category. One point is for his age, one is
because he likely has not lived with a lover for more than two years, one is
because the victim was unrelated, one is for the victim being a stranger, and
the last point is because the victim was male.87 If that same offender had a
prior conviction for assault from a bar fight or an indecent exposure charge
because of public urination, he would find himself in the high risk category.
As a result, this hypothetical offender would be categorized as having the
same actuarial risk as a ten-time convicted child molester who has an
extensive collection of child pornography.
In part because of its tendency to group large populations of sex
offenders together based upon potentially spurious connections, substantial
controversy has emerged among the psychological community about the
use of the STATIC-99. 88 Nonetheless, courts across America regularly cite
STATIC-99 results to support various restrictions on and punishments of
sex offenders. 89 For example, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, recently
reversed a district court sentence because it was too low based, in part, upon
the preference for the objective STATIC-99 categorization of low-moderate
risk instead of the subjective opinion of the defense psychiatrist that did not

86

Id.
Id.; see also ANDREW HARRIS, AMY PHENIX, R. KARL HANSON & DAVID THORNTON,
STATIC-99 CODING RULES (2003).
88
See Richard Wollert, Low Base Rates Limit Expert Certainty When Current Actuarials
Are Used To Identify Sexually Violent Predators: An Application of Bayes’s Theorem, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 56 (2006); CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., RECIDIVISM OF SEX
OFFENDERS (May 2001), www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
89
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 385 F. App’x 114, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing the
STATIC-99 results in affirming a district court sentence); United States v. McIlrath, 512
F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[t]he methodology employed by Static 99 to
predict the probability of recidivism has been accepted in a number of cases”); Bagent v.
Mayberg, No. 1:07-cv-01687-AWI-SKO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94053, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 2010) (recommending that an offender committed to a sex offender treatment
facility not be released even though his STATIC-99 score was based largely on conduct for
which he was not convicted).
87
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use a risk categorization system. 90 Georgia even incorporates STATIC-99
directly into its classification scheme such that a score of 5 or more
automatically places an offender in the “dangerous sexual predator”
category. 91 Notably, even among the advocates and creators of the tool, the
psychological community is united in its belief that STATIC-99 should
only be used by trained professionals as part of an overall diagnostic
profile. 92 The courts’ and legislatures’ usage of the diagnostic tool is
directly at odds with accepted practice in the area.
Further, the notion that the sex offenders are being medically “treated”
as part of this program is largely a fiction. There is no evidence that such
treatment (1) is effective; 93 or (2) could not be done during an offender’s
time in prison. 94 Psychiatric organizations have been unified in their
opposition to these programs in large part because there is no evidence that
“treatment” is the goal or the result.95 In 1996, the American Psychiatric
Association issued a draft report that stated the new state programs “distort
the traditional meanings of civil commitment, misallocate psychiatric
facilities and resources, and constitute an abuse of psychiatry.” 96
To the degree that treatment is possible, it is entirely unclear why such
programs could not be implemented during the prisoner’s original sentence.
If the genuine goal of these civil commitment laws was to “cure” sick
individuals, then it would be preferable to start the process sooner rather
than later. These statutes, however, have actually undermined prison
treatment programs. 97 Because the courts have allowed evidence obtained
during an offender’s prison treatment program to be admitted at a civil
commitment hearing, 98 sex offenders are increasingly forgoing any

90

United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1213 (11th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1318 n.11 (11th Cir. 2010).
92
See, e.g., HARRIS, PHENIX, HANSON, & THORTON, supra note 87, at 3–5; Robert A.
Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 384–85 (2006).
93
See John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y. & L. 468, 472 (1998).
94
See id. at 495–96 (stating that in Washington state sex offenders can undergo treatment
while in prison but they are required to waive confidentiality).
95
See JANUS, supra note 23, at 23.
96
W. Lawrence Fitch, Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States, 989 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 489, 496 (2003).
97
See La Fond, supra note 93, at 495–96 (explaining that prisoners are punished by
participating in prison treatment programs).
98
United States v. Zehnter, 1:06-cr-0219, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4700, *2–*3
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2007) (“Defendant, nevertheless, contends that the report also needs to be
excluded from use by the Bureau of Prisons because the Bureau of Prisons may use
information in the report to determine that he is a sexually dangerous person within the
91
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treatment. 99 From their perspective, it is simply too risky to speak to a
therapist who will then testify against the offender in a hearing that could
result in the offender being detained for life.100 And without confronting
their past misdeeds in a clinical or therapeutic setting, the prison treatment
is rendered wholly ineffective. 101 The end result of these new programs
hardly seems to be medical treatment, but instead is large-scale preventive
detention.
B. LOW BURDEN OF PROOF

Unlike the statute that was reviewed in Kansas v. Hendricks,102 the
AWA SVP provisions only require that the Government show by clear and
convincing evidence that an offender poses a serious risk of recidivism. 103
As a consequence, a person can be detained for life with a burden of proof
not near the certainty required before a criminal tribunal. In contrast, clear
and convincing proof had primarily been used in forums such as bail
hearings where any resultant detention was necessarily of limited duration.
Given the mistaken beliefs about sex offender recidivism by courts and the
general public, the clear and convincing standard seems especially easy to
meet for those that have committed sex crimes in the past. With seemingly
scientific evidence like STATIC-99 being introduced the lower burden of
proof is a small hurdle for a skilled prosecutor.
Further, because of the lower standard, criminal cases that could not
succeed or actually failed can be brought through the AWA process.
Notably, three of the five persons who were designated as “sexually
dangerous” in Comstock were only convicted of possessing child
pornography. 104 So, to commit those three persons, the Government must
essentially stage a criminal trial for “sexually violent conduct” or “child
molestation” at a lower burden of proof with less procedural protections in

meaning of the Adam Walsh Act and, therefore, be subjected to civil commitment under that
Act.”) (internal citation omitted).
99
See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders
After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at 1 (“But many of those committed get no treatment
at all for sex offending, mainly by their own choice. In California, three-quarters of civilly
committed sex offenders do not attend therapy. Many say their lawyers tell them to avoid it
because admission of past misdeeds during therapy could make getting out impossible, or
worse, lead to new criminal charges.”).
100
Id.
101
Id. (“Admitting to previous crimes is a crucial piece of a broad band of treatment,
known as relapse prevention, that is used in at least 15 states and has been the most widely
accepted model for about 20 years.”).
102
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
103
18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(a)(5)–(6), 4248(a), (d) (2006).
104
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1955 (2010).
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order to commit a person to a sex offender facility (assuming that the court
decides that possession of child pornography is not “sexually violent
conduct” or “child molestation”). This means a person may be detained
longer than authorized under the criminal code for offenses that would not
be provable in a criminal court. This is an end run around the criminal
justice system that is the hallmark of preventive detention programs.
C. INDEFINITE TERM

One clear lesson from the state experiences with sex offender facilities
is that once a person is in, they do not get out. Releases have been
extremely rare and have been usually due to factors unrelated to successful
treatment of sex offenders. 105 While persons detained for the War on Terror
may face a lifetime of incarceration, there is at least a prospect that the
seemingly never-ending war will conclude. In contrast, because of the
criteria used to allow a sex offender to leave a detention facility, there is
virtually no chance of release. 106
If the government truly believed that these facilities would effectuate
better treatment for sex offenders than in the prison environment, the statute
authorizes the offenders to be diverted to those facilities at any time during
their incarceration. 107 However, the use of the AWA commitment
provisions indicates that, rather than exhibiting a concern for better
treatment, the government seems particularly concerned that offenders
remain detained in some facility for as long as possible. At the time the
Comstock case was decided by the Fourth Circuit, over 98% of those
designated by the government as “sexually dangerous” were at the end of
105
See Allison Retka, Missouri’s Sexual Predator Law Called Punitive, Preventative,
MO. LAWYERS MEDIA, Dec. 19, 2010, http://molawyersmedia.com/blog/2010/12/19/svp-lawcalled-punitive-preventative/ (subscription required, on file with the Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology) (“Of the 150 sex offenders committed under the law since 1999, not
one has completed treatment and been released.”); Treatment for Sex Offenders Crunches
State Budgets; ‘Civil Commitment’ Programs Create Political Quandary, WASH. POST, Jun.
27, 2010, at A2 (“Wisconsin has released 61 sex offenders since adopting a civilcommitment system in 1994. But in Minnesota, no one has ever gotten out. One man was
released provisionally but got pulled back for a technical violation and later died in
confinement. ‘Are Minnesota sex offenders that much more dangerous than Wisconsin sex
offenders? Why can’t we do that?’ asked Eric Janus, an expert on civil commitment who
heads William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul. Missouri and Pennsylvania have
released one patient each. Nebraska has released one person since 2006. Texas has yet to
release anyone from its outpatient program. That contrasts with states such as California,
which has put nearly 200 offenders back into the community, and New Jersey, where 123
have been let go.”) [hereinafter State Budgets].
106
See Retka, supra note 105; State Budgets, supra note 105.
107
The only requirement in these types of cases is that a person be in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
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their prison sentences and about to be released.108 While not dispositive of
intent, this trend certainly is indicative of a desire by the government to
apply a second term of incarceration with neither a jury trial nor new
wrongful conduct by the offender.
D. STATUTORY CLASSIFICATIONS

Unlike the text and application of the statute in Kansas v. Hendricks,
the federal law opens civil commitment to a much larger population.
Indicative of the potentially broad reach, the Bureau of Prisons reviewed the
files of every single inmate in federal custody, not limiting itself to sex
offenders, to determine if they were eligible for the program. 109 The federal
courts have also approved the use of the law in ways that have been much
more expansive than necessary.
While the federal civil commitment statute is filled with various terms
of art, many are entirely undefined. For example, “sexually violent
conduct,” “child molestation,” and “mental disease, abnormality or
disorder” are essential parts of the statute that have been left for courts and
agencies to determine the meaning. 110 Perhaps most importantly, the
unusual term “serious difficulty” is likely to be the key factor in many
commitment cases because the government must show such difficulty “in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” 111
And there is no guidance as to what “serious difficulty” should mean in this
context.
The Bureau of Prisons has filled the gaps left for some of the statutory
terms but in a manner that would ensure very broad application. For
example, the Bureau defines child molestation as “any unlawful conduct of
a sexual nature with, or sexual exploitation of, a person under the age of 18
years.” 112 Such a definition clearly includes consensual statutory rape and
probably envelops possession of child pornography as well. Similarly,
“sexually violent conduct” has been defined to include instances where a
person is so intoxicated by alcohol or drugs as to be “incapable of
appraising the nature of the conduct.” 113 No actual force or “violence” is
required in such situations. Moreover, because the statute only requires that
these underlying crimes be attempted and not completed and the burden of
108
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 9, at 2 (citing statistics for the Eastern District of
North Carolina).
109
See Amy Baron-Evans & Sara Noonan, Grid & Bear It, CHAMPION, July 2008, at 58,
59.
110
Id. at 58.
111
18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006).
112
28 C.F.R. § 549.93 (2010).
113
Id. § 549.92.
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proof is low, the potential reach of the statute under the Bureau’s definitions
is very broad.
Another unusual aspect of the language of § 4248 is that there is no
mens rea requirement. 114 By including any acts, even unintentional or
merely negligent ones, as the basis for commitment, the statute reaches
much further than any criminal law in this area. Because the persons
designated as “sexually dangerous” have to be diagnosed with some mental
illness, there is some logic to omitting a mens rea requirement. It would be
very difficult to show that a person has a mental illness that so severely
limits self-control as to justify commitment, but would still be able to form
the requisite intent required by most statutes. Regardless, the lack of a
mens rea requirement expands the potential reach of the statute. Thus, a
person who unknowingly acquires child pornography (that he or she
believes to be legal adult pornography) can be designated as “sexually
dangerous” under the Bureau’s broad definitions without ever being
charged, tried, or convicted. 115
Although those initially targeted for detention under 18 U.S.C. § 4248
were sex offenders, nothing in the statute requires a person to have been
convicted of such a crime. Instead, as part of the commitment hearing, the
Government can attempt to prove acts for which the designated person was
often neither charged nor convicted. This inclusion of non-sex offenders
under the SVP law was not accidental as the accompanying regulations in
the Federal Register anticipate commitment of such persons. 116 If the states
114

Baron-Evans & Noonan, supra note 109, at 58.
Because the statute has only begun to be applied, there have been no such cases yet.
However, child pornography alone has served as the sole crime underlying an SVP
designation. See United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Matherly
had pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(5)(B) and § 2252(b)(2) and received a sentence of 41-months imprisonment,
followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. The Government certified him as a
‘sexually dangerous’ person on November 22, 2006, one day before his projected release
date.”); United States v. Bolander, No. 01-CR-2864-L, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134749, at
*1-2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Defendant is a federal prisoner who is being held in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons pending the resolution of civil commitment proceedings
pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248. In
February 2002, Defendant was committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to serve
three sentences of imprisonment, arising from a conviction for possession of child
pornography and two violations of supervised release. Defendant was also sentenced to a
three-year term of supervised release. Shortly before Defendant was to be released, the
Government filed a ‘Certification of a Sexually Dangerous Person’ under 18 U.S.C. §
4248(a). As a result, Defendant has remained in custody beyond his term of incarceration.”).
116
72 Fed. Reg. 43205, 43206 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 549) (the
proposed regulations were “not limited to offenses for which he/she has been convicted or is
presently incarcerated, or for which he/she presently faces charges” but include “any conduct
of the person for which evidence or information is available”).
115
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provide a prediction of what will happen at the federal level, then civil
commitment will be frequently used for conduct which could not be proven
at trial or which resulted in convictions that would be subsequently
overturned. 117
The dynamics of modern plea bargaining also create unique risks of
over-expansive application of the AWA’s civil commitment provisions.
Because post-release institutionalization is considered to be a “collateral
consequence” that does not directly flow from a person’s conviction, the
courts have repeatedly held that there is no obligation to inform a person
pleading guilty about the possibility of civil commitment.118 As Professor
Jenny Roberts has astutely recognized, the lack of notice given to many
offenders in these cases about civil commitment means that they may plead
guilty to a lesser offense with limited jail time only to find themselves
facing a lifetime of detention. 119
E. LIMITED INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS

It is difficult, if not impossible, to name a group in the United States
that is more reviled than sex offenders. They are a population with no
political power and limited resources that is subject to unrelenting negative
media coverage reinforcing their vulnerability. 120 In such circumstances,

117

See, e.g., Jason Cantone, Rational Enough to Punish, but Too Irrational to Release:
The Integrity of Sex Offender Civil Commitment, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 693, 694–95 (2009):
A jury found Crane guilty of four criminal charges and sentenced him to thirty-five years to life
in prison. However, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed all of the convictions except for lewd
and lascivious behavior. Addressing the attempted sodomy and attempted rape charges, the
court found that a “fatally defective” complaint denied Crane his due process rights. The
kidnapping conviction was reversed because there was insufficient evidence. Fearing that the
last charge could be dropped in a retrial, the prosecutor accepted a plea for aggravated sexual
battery, and Crane was sentenced to time served.
With Crane’s victims outraged and the community fearing the release of another sex offender
who would prey on its children, the prosecutor sought to declare Crane a sexually violent
predator (SVP) under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA), which allowed
indefinite civil commitment. To civilly commit Crane, the State needed to prove: (1) that Crane
was convicted of a sex crime and (2) that he suffered from a mental condition that makes him
likely to engage in future sexual predatory acts. Crane’s guilty plea to the lesser charge of
aggravated sexual battery guaranteed the first element would be met. To prove the second
element, the State relied upon a psychiatrist from Crane’s original trial who found Crane to be a
sexual deviant and exhibitionist who enjoyed fearful responses from victims. This established
the necessary elements for a commitment, and the jury unanimously committed Crane after
ninety minutes of deliberation.
118

See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004).
See generally Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent
Predators”, 93 MINN. L. REV. 670 (2008).
120
See JANUS, supra note 23, at 3.
119
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the normal impediments that exist to check governmental abuse of liberties
are absent. These institutional checks occur at a variety of levels.
Government abuse can often be blunted by public pressure,
countermajoritarian court decisions, media exposure, or acts by individual
political figures. None of those is likely to be present in regard to
preventive detention of sex offenders.
Public opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of virtually every sex
offender restriction that has been passed (with only economic cost
providing any basis for opposition). In addition to SVP laws, a wide range
of sex offender laws have been passed at the behest of a fearful public
including registration requirements, 121 community notification,122 residency
restrictions, 123 loitering laws, 124 Global Positioning System (GPS)
monitoring, 125 higher mandatory minimums, 126 evidentiary restrictions in
child pornography cases, 127 specially marked driver’s licenses,128 chemical
castration 129 (with one state allowing for surgical castration as well 130), and
the death penalty for child rapists.131 In such a political environment, any

121

See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 50
(2007).
123
See Paula Reed Ward, Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders Popular, but
Ineffective, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2008, at B1.
124
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122, at 100.
125
See Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions
on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 124 (2007).
126
See John Q. La Fond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral?
Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 410–
11 (1999) (“Most states have increased criminal sentences for convicted sex offenders and
more sex offenders are actually serving longer prison terms. Some states have passed
mandatory life sentences for certain sex offenders.”).
127
See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) (2006).
128
See Bill Would Modify IDs for Sex Offenders, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD (Cal.),
May 26, 2010, at A5 (“Driver’s licenses in Delaware are marked with the letter ‘Y,’ and
Louisiana emblazons licenses with the words ‘sex offender.’”).
129
See John Gramlich, Lawsuits Test Crackdown on Sex Criminals, STATELINE
(Apr. 18, 2008), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=302066.
130
See Robert Crowe, Is It Tarot or Porno? Offender in Trouble, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, at 1A (“[I]n 1997, Texas became the first state to allow surgical
castration for repeat sex offenders.”).
131
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651 (2008) (“Five States have since
followed Louisiana’s lead [in imposing the death penalty for rape of a child]: Georgia, see
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (2007) (enacted 1999); Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5503 (2007) (enacted 1997); Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT., Tit. 10, § 7115(K) (West 2007
Supp.) (enacted 2006); South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(C)(1) (Supp. 2007)
(enacted 2006); and Texas, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3) (West Supp. 2007)
(enacted 2007); see also § 22.021(a).”).
122
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expectation that public pressure would limit the use of preventive detention
for sex offenders is misguided.
Similarly, the media has acted to not only reinforce, but to inflame
public passions about the issue by labeling it an ongoing “war.” 132 As I
have written elsewhere, the media has even prodded already harsh
legislatures to enact even more draconian laws on sex offenders:
When Bill O’Reilly started a segment on his Fox News show that exposed states with
“weak” sex offender laws, one of his early targets was Alabama. Because of the
O’Reilly segment, the Governor called a special session of the legislature which met
133
one week later and passed new harsh sex offender restrictions unanimously.

Broadcast television even allocated programming somewhere between
news media and entertainment, which stoked public fears when the show To
Catch a Predator became a sensation. 134 There is simply no reason in our
modern world of sensationalized media coverage to expect the media to be
a watchdog for government abuse of sex offenders through preventive
detention.
At different moments throughout American history, the courts have
stepped in to prevent a public caught up in the moment from infringing on
basic constitutional liberties. However, when it comes to sex offenders,
their decisions have trended strongly in the opposite direction. While a
variety of constitutional rights and doctrines have been implicated by new
sex offender laws, the courts have refused to recognize this and instead

132
See, e.g., Mark Donald, Hello My Name Is Pervert, DALLAS OBSERVER, Jan. 11, 2001,
at 34 (“Among their numbers is an even smaller percentage who kidnap and maim and
murder and who set the harsh tone of the war against all sex offenders.”); Brian Friel, The
War on Kiddie Porn, NAT’L J., Mar. 25, 2006, at 40 (“No matter what happens in Congress,
law enforcement officials expect child porn—and the war on porn—to continue
expanding.”); Dave Johnston, Proposed Sex-Criminal Law Reaches Too Far, U. CAL. SAN
DIEGO GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 2007, available at http://www.ucsdguardian.org/opinion/
proposedsexcriminallawreachestoofar (“Americans have a growing cache of weapons in the
war on sexual predators.”); Lisa B. McPheron, Team Formed to Keep Track of Sex
Offenders, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Jan. 20, 2006, at B08a (“‘This is a pandemic
issue that we can’t take serious enough,’ she said. ‘This is a war.’”) (quoting activist Erin
Runnion); Tough Child Sex Crimes Bill Now Law in California; Loopholes for Child Rapists
Closed, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 4, 2005 (“‘This is the real battleground in the war against child
molesters,’ said PROTECT executive director, Grier Weeks. ‘For every child abducted by a
stranger, there are tens of thousands who are prisoners in their own homes. Today, we won a
major victory for these children.’”); Maria Vogel-Short, Rarely Seen, Always There, N.J.
LAW., Dec. 23, 2002, at 1 (“It’s a plain, nondescript room on the fifth floor of Trenton’s
Justice Complex, where handpicked cops who can work computers with the same ease that
others work radar or stakeouts, quietly wage war on child molesters and others who can be
nailed via the computer.”).
133
War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 458.
134
To Catch a Predator (NBC).
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have shown a willingness to create rules to accommodate these statutes.135
Courts have engaged in legal gymnastics to find all of the following to be
non-punitive: registration, 136 civil commitment, 137 residency restrictions, 138
and, unbelievably, criminal prosecutions for failing to register carrying ten
year prison penalties. 139 As a result, numerous constitutional rights have
been held to not apply to sex offenders subject to those restrictions,
programs, and prosecutions.
Sometimes, political or other prominent figures will emerge to lead the
charge against excessive governmental actions which infringe upon basic
freedoms. In the case of sex offenders, it is likely that either no such person
will emerge or that they will simply be ignored. In the case of the various
restrictions passed against sex offenders, they are usually passed
unanimously and without debate. 140 The story of Patty Wetterling presents
an interesting instance of a person with sufficient credibility to question sex
offender laws largely being dismissed. Wetterling’s son, Jacob, was

135

War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 459–71.
See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
137
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
138
See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
139
See, e.g., United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2008) (“As was the case
in Smith, SORNA’s registration requirement demonstrates no congressional intent to punish
sex offenders.”); United States v. Pitts, No. 07-157-A, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82632, at
*16–17 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2007) (“As to the first prong of the test, the Congress clearly
intended this to be a civil, nonpunitive, regulatory regime. Congress stated that intent in the
text of the statute by declaring that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act was
established ‘in order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children.’
Nothing in the Walsh Act suggests that this was intended to be anything else.”) (internal
citation omitted); United States v. Cardenas, No. 07-80108-Cr-Hurley/Vitunac, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88803, at *29 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2007) (“Like the Alaska statute in Smith,
SORNA was entirely codified in a section of the code, civil in nature, which is devoted to
‘Public Health and Welfare,’ with the exception of the new federal failure to register crime
which is codified in Title 18. The preponderance of SORNA relates to a national registration
system that cures defects in the state systems and provides uniformity in the management of
sex offender registration information. For these reasons, this Court finds that SORNA is a
civil, non-punitive law.”); United States v. Buxton, No. CR-07-082-R, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76142, at *11 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2007) (“Congress expressly stated that the
purpose of SORNA was ‘to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against
children.’ This Court concurs with the above cases wherein the courts concluded that
SORNA’s stated purpose is non-punitive.”) (internal citation omitted); United States v.
Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747, 755 (W.D. Va. 2007); United States v. Lang, No. CR-07-0080HE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56642, at *5 (W.D. Okla. June 5, 2007); United States v. Mason,
510 F. Supp. 2d 923, 929 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
140
See Wayne Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion
Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1 n.9 (2006).
136
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kidnapped at gunpoint in 1989. 141 After the tragic disappearance of her son,
Wetterling formed a major non-profit organization that focused on
improving child safety. 142 She lambasted government officials for
inadequate efforts to address sex crimes against children. 143 Her efforts led
to the federal predecessor law of the AWA, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sex Offender Registration Act, 144 and other laws
being passed across the United States.145 More recently, however,
Wetterling has become an outspoken critic of sex offender residency
restrictions, lifetime registration, and other newer statutes. 146 She believes
141

Richard Meryhew, Jacob’s Legacy; Ten Years of Heartache Haven’t Weakened Patty
Wetterling’s Tireless Resolve to Protect Children, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 17, 1999,
at 1A.
142
Id.
143
Daniel R. Browning, Bill Calls for National Registry of Sex Offenders After Prison,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1993, at 7A (“[Patty Wetterling] started the Jacob
Wetterling Foundation to lobby for a law requiring convicted sex offenders to register with
authorities when they are freed from prison. So far, 24 states have passed such a law,
including Illinois, which requires registration for 10 years after parole. Missouri does not
require sex offenders to register with authorities, but Attorney General Jay Nixon is
interested in the idea, said a spokeswoman for Nixon. In a telephone interview last week,
Patty Wetterling said a federal law was needed so sex offenders wouldn’t be able to slip
from scrutiny in states that don’t have registration requirements. Most child-sex offenders
are habitual criminals, she said.”).
144
Greg Gordon, Wetterling Sets Her Sights on House Seat; Experts Say She Is a Long
Shot Against Incumbent Kennedy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 27, 2004, at A1.
145
Browning, supra note 143.
146
See, e.g., Catharine Skipp and Arian Campo-Flores, A Bridge Too Far: Residency
Restrictions Have Forced Child Sex Offenders in Florida to Camp Out Under a Causeway,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 2009, at 46, 50 (“‘If an offender ends up with no residence, that
shouldn’t make any of us feel safer,’ says Patty Wetterling, whose son’s abduction prompted
the creation of the first federal sex-offender registry in 1994. ‘What they need is stability,
support, counseling, and treatment.’”); Patty Wetterling, The Harm in Sex-Offender Laws,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sep. 14, 2007, available at http://www.sacbee.com/110/
story/377462.html:
But I’m worried that we’re focusing so much energy on naming and shaming convicted sex
offenders that we’re not doing as much as we should to protect our children from other real
threats.
Many states make former offenders register for life, restrict where they can live, and make their
details known to the public. And yet the evidence suggests these laws may do more harm than
good. . . . . Few people today are concerned about the rights of sex offenders. Most now
complain our laws are not tough enough.
But they might be missing some basic facts. First, in most states “sex offender” covers anyone,
including juveniles, convicted of any sexual offense, including consensual teenage sex, public
urination and other non-violent crimes. Second, Jacob was the exception, not the rule: more than
90 percent of sexual violence is committed by someone the child knows. And third, most
shocking to me, sex offenders are less likely to re-offend than commonly thought. A Department
of Justice study suggested ex-offenders have a recidivism rate of 3 percent to 5 percent within
the first three years after release. . . . .We need better answers. We need to fund prevention

2011]

SEX OFFENDER EXCEPTIONALISM

993

that the government has overreacted based upon a societal panic about sex
offenders. 147 Even while running for Congress, 148 she has steadfastly
maintained that some sex offender policies ultimately do a disservice to
children like her son Jacob. 149 Not surprisingly, now that she is an advocate
against sex offender laws, politicians are less willing to champion her
cause.
With the courts, politicians, media, and public aligned in supporting
virtually every sex offender law that is proposed, it is difficult to imagine
that preventive detention will face any serious opposition. Perhaps the only
possible check is economic. The cost of housing sex offenders in these
facilities is very high. 150 Yet, despite enormous budgetary pressures, SVP
programs have become budgetary “sacred cow[s]” in jurisdictions because
of political pressures in favor of them. 151 As the United States economy

programs that stop sexual violence before it happens. We need to look at what can help those
released from prison to succeed so that they don’t victimize again—and that probably means
housing and jobs and treatment and community support. Given that current laws are extremely
popular, taking truly effective measures may exact a high political price. But that’s surely not
too much to pay to prevent the kidnap, rape or murder of another child.
147

Wetterling, supra note 146.
See Gordon, supra note 144, at 1A.
149
Barbara Polichetti, Residency Limits on Sex Offenders Questioned, PROVIDENCE J.,
Dec. 6, 2008, at A2:
148

Patty Wetterling has spent 19 years trying to find out what happened to her son, Jacob, abducted
at age 11 while riding his bike near the family’s Minnesota home.
But although she is well aware that statistics show sexual assault is the prime motivation in child
kidnappings, Wetterling doesn’t back tough residency restrictions for convicted sex
offenders . . . .
As one of the conference’s keynote speakers, Wetterling, a former math teacher who now serves
as director of sexual violence prevention for the Minnesota Department of Health, said she came
to Rhode Island to “talk about hope.”
“The topic of sex offenders is one that promotes fear, and I know that fear because I lived it,” she
said. “I lived it and I didn’t like it so I have moved [toward] hope. I have hope that I will find
out what happened to my son.”
“And we must have hope that sex offenders will succeed in their rehabilitation, because that is
the ultimate safety for our children.”
150
See Gary Craig, Cost and Number Committed Surpass State’s Expectations,
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Dec. 24, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 25407862:

The program is far costlier than imprisoning criminals: a civilly detained offender costs four
times the spending for an inmate jailed in a state prison. New York’s average price tag to treat
sex offenders in secured facilities—about $175,000 a person—makes it the costliest program of
its kind in the country, slightly more than in California. . . . For New York lawmakers, this will
create a demand for tens of millions of tax dollars in coming years at the same time that officials
face dire budgetary constraints.
151

Id.
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recovers, even the modest economic constraints that exist will surely
diminish.
IV. DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS
Because of the severe deprivation of basic freedoms involved with
lifetime detainment, it might simply be enough to object to such laws on
that basis alone. However, the leeway that has been afforded to the
government regarding sex offenders is particularly problematic because of
the precedents being set. By using particularly broad statutory language
and court rulings, the exceptions relevant to sex offenders threaten to
swallow the general rule for Americans. Further, as these commitment
provisions fit into a larger criminal war on sex offenders, they represent
particular dangers over the long term.
A. BROAD APPLICATION AND COURT RULINGS

The language of the federal SVP statute gives it a wide reach and its
indefinite term with limited review affords significant government control
of individuals. However, not satisfied with the already broad terms of the
AWA civil commitment program, the government has sought to expand its
scope even further. And courts have issued opinions in reviewing the
constitutionality of the statute that have gone beyond what is necessary to
uphold the statute. The result of these two trends is that the limits of
preventive detention application are being pushed more broadly, setting
dangerous future precedents.
Even though the Government might not be expected to test the limits
of the AWA criteria until it had received clear court approval,152 early cases
show the potentially dangerous strategic use of the statute.
The
Government has attempted to move persons to sex offender facilities from
immigration detention,153 into a Bureau of Prisons facility because of space

152

Baron-Evans & Noonan, supra note 109, at 58 (noting that in its initial attempts to
commit persons, the “[Bureau of Prisons] is presumably exercising the utmost care in filing
[Sexually Dangerous Person] certifications in order to minimize judicial discomfort with the
statute”).
153
United States v. Hernandez-Arenado, 571 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2009):
This case presents us with the question of whether a person held by the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”—formerly the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)) who is placed in a facility run by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), is in the custody
of the BOP for purposes of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the “Act”)
or whether he is in the custody of the ICE and therefore does not fall within that Act. Under the
Act, if he is in the custody of the BOP and is certified to be a sexually dangerous person, his
release from custody is stayed and he is subject to civil commitment.

(internal citation omitted).
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constraints in United States Army prisons, 154 and to move some who had
been determined incompetent to stand trial.155 In several cases, the
Government even contended that persons already released from federal
custody were eligible for certification to be placed in civil commitment. 156
Because of the low burden of proof on the Government in AWA civil
commitment cases, it is easier for offenders to be moved into that stream
when legal actions in other environments show only limited possibilities of
success. Now, with the courts being largely complacent as to the use of
AWA civil commitment, it is likely that more offenders in a variety of
154

United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2010):

Appellee Benjamin Barnard Joshua was an Army officer stationed in Germany. He was
prosecuted by military court-martial in 1995 for sexually molesting children in violation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (the “UCMJ”). After Joshua pleaded guilty, the court-martial
sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment. The court-martial also ordered loss of pay and
dishonorable discharge. Joshua began serving his prison sentence with an Army garrison in
Germany. He was later transferred to the United States Disciplinary Barracks in Leavenworth,
Kansas (“USDB Leavenworth”), operated by the military.
In June 2001, when USDB Leavenworth was being downsized, the Army transferred Joshua to
the BOP. He was initially housed at the Federal Correctional Institute in Sandstone, Minnesota,
and later transferred to the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North Carolina. Because of
his military prisoner status, the BOP housed Joshua under a May 1994 “Memorandum of
Agreement” between the Army and BOP (the “Memorandum”) regarding “Transfer of Military
Prisoners to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.” Under this agreement, the BOP promised to house
up to 500 military prisoners for the Army’s convenience. The BOP has called such prisoners
“[c]ontractual boarders.” Although they become “subject to all [ ]BOP administrative and
institutional policies and procedures,” the Memorandum states that military prisoners within
BOP facilities remain “in permanent custody of the U.S. Army,” which “retain[s] clemency
authority.”
On March 9, 2009, eight days before Joshua’s scheduled release, the Attorney General certified
him as “sexually dangerous” and the government filed a petition for civil commitment under §
4248. Joshua moved to dismiss the petition, claiming that he was not “in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons.”

(internal citations omitted); United States v. Parker, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19327 (4th Cir.
Sep. 16, 2010).
155
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 9, at 3:
After Respondent Shane Catron was found not competent to stand trial, the government filed a
“Certificate of Mental Disease or Defect and Dangerousness” under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. Two
months later, the government withdrew the § 4246 certificate and substituted a certificate
pursuant to § 4248. Throughout his competency study, the § 4246 certification process, and the
initial period of his § 4248 certification, Mr. Catron was hospitalized at the Federal Medical
Center in Butner, North Carolina. He is now incarcerated in the segregated housing unit of FCIButner.
156

United States v. Broncheau, Nos. 5:06-HC-2219-BO, 5:07-HC-2101-BO, 5:07-HC2148-BO, 5:07-HC-2166-BO, 5:07-HC-2025-BO, 5:07-HC-2185-BO, 5:07-HC-2206-BO,
5:08-HC-2037-BO, 5:07-HC-2063-BO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126202, at *1 (E.D.N.C.
Nov. 22, 2010) (“Respondents are former federal prisoners who have had Certifications of a
Sexually Dangerous Person pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4248 filed against them by the federal
government under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.”).
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locations throughout the federal legal system might find themselves in the
civil commitment net.
The potential reach of a sex offender civil commitment program was
initially widened by the Court’s holding in Hendricks. One of the oddities
created by the Court’s decision is that a statute that applies more broadly
and offers less protection for individual rights will be more likely to be held
constitutional. If a state enacted a law that authorized civil commitment to
only those persons convicted of sex offenses and offered the full panoply of
constitutional safeguards of a criminal trial, the established methodology
will mean that the statute is more likely to be determined punitive and not
civil. However, if a statute applies to any person who is potentially
sexually dangerous and offers scant procedural protections that are
associated with civil hearings, the Hendricks analysis would indicate that
such a law would certainly be constitutional. This counterintuitive result
can occur because the Court determines punitiveness largely based upon
whether the hearing seems more like a criminal or civil process and if the
conduct regulated appears to be entirely coextensive with the criminal
statute used in the prior criminal trial. As a result, Hendricks and its
progeny essentially encourage legislatures around America to offer less due
process and allow preventive detention to be applied as widely as possible
in order to ensure constitutionality.
The Comstock opinion 157 is certainly notable in the extensive authority
that has been given to the federal government in this area. The Court could
have simply decided that a person’s original conviction based upon an
enumerated power (usually the Commerce Clause) would have afforded the
federal government the authority to divert a person to a mental facility. A
tightly woven analogy to persons who commit crimes or suffer a mental
breakdown in prison could have provided a narrow ruling. However, the
majority opinion essentially rewrote law surrounding the Necessary and
Proper Clause to allow for virtually unfettered federal power in the area of
sex offender civil commitment.
Lower federal courts have also been permissive in upholding other
aspects related to the federal SVP law. Because of the recent application of
the civil commitment provisions, there have only been a handful of cases
thus far. Yet, the early opinions by the federal appellate courts are
disconcerting. The First Circuit allowed a diagnosis to be used to commit a
person that the defense expert concluded
was not a generally accepted diagnosis in the mental health community, did not fit
within the DSM definition of paraphilia, lacked diagnostic criteria and could not be
consistently defined; that normal adults may find adolescents arousing; and that

157

United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
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articles offered by the government to support a hebephilia diagnosis were not
158
legitimate peer-reviewed research.

The Court found that neither consensus of the medical community nor
placement within the DSM was necessary to be the statutory definition of
“mental illness.” 159 The Second Circuit held that court-ordered polygraph
tests taken throughout a convict’s supervised release could be used as
evidence in a subsequent civil commitment hearing. 160 This effectively
removed any right against self-incrimination and allowed for governmentcompelled testimony in civil commitment cases. While there is still a
chance for federal courts to limit the scope of the federal SVP law, early
indications are not supportive of that possibility.
B. WAR MENTALITY

While murderers, armed assailants, gang leaders, and spousal abusers
return to the streets of America after their sentences are complete, sex
offenders are treated differently. The distinction between those who
commit sex offenses and other criminals is not so much substantive as it is
political. America has begun what can only be described as a criminal war
on sex offenders akin to the War on Drugs that has continued for nearly
forty years. 161 And as in any war, domestic or foreign, the normal rules
protecting liberty are suspended and significant exceptions are made to
allow for wartime governmental action. In the case of the drug war, the
changes to constitutional doctrine and policing in general have been

158

United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2010).
Id. at 39–40 (“The district court may have assumed that the statutory concept is
delimited by the consensus of the medical community, but this is not so. Further, a mental
disorder or defect need not necessarily be one so identified in the DSM in order to meet the
statutory requirement.”).
160
United States v. Ayers, 371 F. App’x 162, 163 (2d Cir. 2010):
159

[Ayers’s] sole challenge is to the district court’s failure to prohibit the use of testing results in
any future civil commitment proceedings.
The absence of such a prohibition does not intrude on a cognizable liberty interest. The SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is expressly limited to “any criminal case.”
Moreover, federal regulations contemplate that civil commitment decisions will be based on all
available relevant evidence.
Ayers nevertheless suggests that because no statutory or constitutional provision expressly bars
the use of the ordered examination results during civil commitment proceedings, the district
court was required to provide such protection to ensure that the condition did not reach farther
than required by legitimate sentencing concerns. The argument misunderstands the nature of the
relevant inquiry under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), which focuses on the unnecessary deprivation of
liberty as reflected in an existing right.

(internal citations omitted).
161
War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 444–46.
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substantial. 162 Once these exceptions are made, they are rarely, if ever,
removed. A criminal war is marked by three elements: myth creation,
exception-making, and a marshaling of resources. 163
Civil commitment fits well within all three criteria in the War on Sex
Offenders. As mentioned previously, the cost of civil commitment is
exorbitant and requires a substantial marshaling of resources to
implement. 164 With federal block grants under the AWA buttressing the
states, the programs are better funded than they ever have been.165 The
entrance of the federal government into a criminal war is a notable event
because criminal justice expenses are a much higher percentage of state
budgets (and are thus often unsustainable). 166
Civil commitment relies on and reinforces several myths regarding sex
offenders. Because of the focus on post-release recidivism, SVP laws are
part of the narrative of “incurable” sex offenders discussed earlier. The
laws also emphasize the danger of strangers instead of the 90% of child
molestations which are done by acquaintances, friends, and family
members. 167 By creating a program focused on “stranger danger,” it spends
an inordinate amount of criminal justice resources to fulfill the goals
created by a widespread myth.
Also significant is that the civil commitment programs maintain the
illusion of a homogenous sex offender class.168 As I have noted elsewhere,
sex offenders are a remarkably diverse group:
There are, of course, rapists, child molesters, and child pornographers as some of the
focal populations. However, many other crimes are substantially represented on sex
offender registries, including flashers, gropers, voyeurs, prostitutes, persons who have
engaged in an adult incest relationship, stalkers, and those who have committed
bestiality.
Even that extensive list only tells part of the story. For example, many persons are
currently on sex offender registries for consensual sodomy even though such statutes
are presumptively unconstitutional after Lawrence v. Texas. Producers of obscene
videos can also be considered sex offenders . . . .
There are, however, many other sex offenders reported in the media who further
illustrate that the sex offender population is far from homogeneous. In many states,
public urination is prosecuted as public indecency, meaning that those persons so
convicted are categorized with flashers. For example, Janet Allison was a mother

162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 440–46.
Fabian, supra note 62, at 45.
State Budgets, supra note 105.
See Perlman, supra note 38.
War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 455–58.
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who, after trying to stop her fifteen-year-old daughter’s relationship, allowed her
daughter’s boyfriend to move in with the family. She was prosecuted as an accessory
to statutory rape and is subject to the full range of sex offender requirements and
restrictions in her state. Other crimes are so strange as to defy categorization. A
recent survey found that 20% of teens engage in “sexting” which is the transmission
of images that might be deemed child pornography. Already, some prosecutors have
sought to charge such teens with distribution of child pornography for “sexting.”
The sex offender population is so diverse that treating the population as a monolith, as
169
almost all modern sex offender laws have, is foolish.

While it might appear that the label “sexually dangerous person” might
be narrower than the overall population of sex offenders, it is unclear to
what degree the label is not all-inclusive. As noted previously, the Bureau
of Prisons’s definitions of operative statutory language give wide latitude to
the government in seeking civil commitment. Further, because the
“sexually dangerous” classification does not require a past sex crime
conviction, it is in some ways broader than the already confused “sex
offender” category.
The exception-making aspect of criminal wars typically comes about
in court doctrines but emerges in other ways as well. In the case of new
constitutional exceptions, civil commitment has radically changed the areas
related to the Ex Post Facto Clause, 170 due process, 171 the Commerce
Clause, 172 and double jeopardy. 173 Because of the newness of the laws,
there has been very little litigation as to standards for release, but it is likely
that new constitutional issues will emerge in those cases as well.174 A nonconstitutional exception being brought about by civil commitment of sex
offenders is the blurring of the lines between criminal punishment and
medical treatment. Indeed, it is the cooption of psychiatry for criminal ends
that has troubled many members of the medical community. 175
Criminal wars bring costs not associated with traditional crime
fighting. As civil commitment has become part of the War on Sex
Offenders, it too will be subject to and part of these broad consequences.
The primary concerns with criminal war fighting related to policy lock, the
169

Id. at 455–56.
Id. at 459–63.
171
Id. at 468–72.
172
Id. at 463–67.
173
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
174
For example, in the context of residency restrictions on sex offenders, new
constitutional claims are regularly attempted with occasional success. See, e.g., Mann v. Ga.
Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007) (holding that retroactive application of residency
restriction to a preestablished residence was an unconstitutional taking of the sex offender’s
property).
175
Harris, supra note 48, at 340.
170
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erosion of civil liberties on a wide scale, collateral damage, and exceptions
becoming rules.
A criminal war can bring about a policy lock that prevents policy
corrections even in the face of failure.176 The War on Drugs, in particular,
has been marked by growing escalation as evidence has increasingly shown
it to be ineffective.177 Because a war is an existential crisis premised on the
idea that the enemy is a genuine threat to our way of life, it cannot simply
be abandoned in the manner of other failed criminal justice programs. 178 As
the War on Drugs has illustrated, rather than eliminating failed policies, the
course taken is usually escalation.179
In the case of civil commitment of sex offenders, politicians have
already demonstrated a seeming immunity to evidence of ineffectiveness
and have pushed science aside in formulating the laws. As Eric Janus
noted:
Despite the acknowledged failure of the earlier sex offender commitment laws,
Washington and Minnesota returned to this legal form in the early 1990s to address
the “gap” in social control. A few other states . . . quickly followed suit . . . . Almost
all of the second-wave laws claim to address “sexual predators,” a term that invokes
images of nonhuman beasts, and places the role of psychiatric disorder more in the
180
background.

With the societal panic regarding sex offenders being so high, it is
difficult to imagine a shift away from civil commitment. One need only
imagine the media coverage and political advertisements decrying the
release of “sexual predators” into the street. 181 As noted previously, the
lack of institutional checks in regard to SVP laws make policy lock a likely
consequence as part of the War on Sex Offenders.
The case that SVP laws erode civil liberty is fairly easy to make. It is
the greatest violation of a person’s freedom to be incarcerated against his or
her will, potentially for life, with little or no legal recourse, subject to
unauthorized treatment, and based upon standards and procedures far less
than would normally be afforded in such a situation. However, the
potential reach of the SVP laws is still to be determined. The phrase
“sexually dangerous” has proven to be highly malleable (including

176

War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 472–73.
Id.
178
Radley Balko, More on Drug Czar's Bid To End War on Drugs, REASON HIT & RUN
(May 14, 2009), http://reason.com/blog/show/133496.html.
179
War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 437–40.
180
JANUS, supra note 23, at 22–23.
181
See, e.g., Keith Matheny, Areas Fear Predators' Releases: States Struggle with What
To Do When Sexually Violent Offenders Finish Their Sentences, USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 2010,
at 3A.
177
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possession of child pornography and statutory rape according to the Bureau
of Prisons). Further, because of permissive court rulings, the only real
limitations on who can be committed are statutory and not constitutional.
Presently, there is nothing in the existing case law to preclude broader
definitions of populations from becoming eligible for commitment.
Criminal wars, like military ones, inevitably bring collateral
damage. 182 In the case of civil commitment of sex offenders, families may
be forever broken apart, persons who have committed minor offenses might
be detained for life, and resources might be taken away from more effective
policies against sexual violence.
These forms of intentional and
unintentional collateral damage will be a consequence of long-term use of
preventive detention of sex offenders.
A highly salient point throughout this Article has been the way in
which precedents have enormous staying power. And when an exception is
created for sex offenders, it becomes a rationale for another vulnerable
group to be targeted. Ultimately, the exception stops being exceptional and
instead becomes the rule. This has been a particularly negative aspect of
the War on Drugs. Police forces have become militarized in areas beyond
drug-fueled gang violence. 183 The doctrines of the First,184 Second, 185
Fourth, 186 Fifth, 187 Sixth, 188 Eighth, 189 Ninth, 190 Tenth, 191 and Fourteenth 192

182

War on Sex Offenders, supra note 15, at 475–77.
Rafeal Hermoso, Police Brutality an Endemic, Not Isolated Problem, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Sept. 28, 1999, available at LEXIS.
184
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (creating what appears to be a drug
use speech exception for students); Tom C. Rawlings, Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith: The Supreme Court Deserts the Free Exercise Clause, 25 GA. L.
REV. 567, 593 (1991) (defining a limitation to the Free Exercise Clause related to the use of
drugs for religious purposes).
185
See Robert J. Cottrol, Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures
of Criminal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1032 n.8
(1998).
186
See Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on
Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript
White Powder in Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 603–05 (1998).
183

The impact of the drug war on the scope of Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable
search and seizure has been dramatic. Intensified law enforcement efforts involving wiretaps, as
well as innovations in search and seizure such as police saturation patrols and street sweeps, drug
courier profiles, aerial surveillance, drug testing, thermal surveillance, and the demise of the
‘knock and announce’ rule, all justified by the exigencies of the War on Drugs, have
significantly encroached on Fourth Amendment protections of personal privacy.

(footnotes omitted); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A
Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002);
David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car
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Amendments have all been changed because of certain aspects of the drug
war. As the War on Sex Offenders is still in its early stages, it is too early
to tell what the long-term implications of ongoing exception-making will
be.
V. CONCLUSION
Our nation is one that has defined the legal term “sex offender” very
broadly to include, among other crimes, people convicted of rape, indecent
exposure (including some public urinators), possession of child
pornography, voyeurism, production or distribution of obscenity, bestiality,
solicitation of a prostitute, statutory rape, distribution of child pornography
(including what has become known as “sexting” by teenagers), 193 incest,
and lower degrees of sexual assault including groping. It has not even been
a decade since the Supreme Court finally struck down laws punishing

Bostick: The Fourth Amendment Takes a Back Seat to the Drug War, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV.
825 (1993).
187
See Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy,
103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2612 (1994) (“[T]he property rights acknowledged by the Fifth
Amendment have been greatly undermined by civil asset forfeitures. When the drug war
finally ends, these rights and freedoms will only be regained with great struggle.”).
188
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Sixth Amendment rights have also been whittled down to fight the War on Drugs. Those
accused of selling drugs have no right to confront their accuser, presumably to protect
informants, even though the Sixth Amendment clearly states that “the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation [and] to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
189

See id. at 668–69 (“Traditionally, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ has been used to require that any punishment is proportional to the crime
committed. Mandatory minimums have taken away judicial discretion in sentencing and
mock the idea of proportional punishment. In 1997, a low-level crack dealer on a first
offense charge would have served ten years and six months, while a weapons charge would
have earned seven years and seven months and rape would have earned a mere six years and
five months.”).
190
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (rejecting Ninth and Tenth Amendment
arguments in upholding the Controlled Substances Act as applied under the Commerce
Clause power).
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See id.
192
See Robert Michael Dykes, Comment, Cache and Prizes: Drug Asset Forfeiture in
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consensual sodomy. 194 In such an environment, we authorize the
government to detain indefinitely those who are deemed “sexually
dangerous” at our peril. Such a tool and the legal exception-making
necessitated by it represent a fundamental shift in the protection of our basic
liberties. Once the government has such a power, it will not be easily taken
away. And although few of us may shed tears for the rapists and child
molesters subject to these new legal provisions, the potentially unending
reach of these programs represents a threat to all us. In the name of
protecting children and treating the mentally ill, there is the greatest danger
to freedom because we may not see the threats to our way of life until it is
too late.
Preventive detention, by its very nature, represents a departure from
the normal model of criminal justice. It is usually justified as a necessary
precaution in times of war, including criminal wars. Instead of waiting for
someone to commit a wrong, the government acts to restrict liberty of
persons who have yet to commit a wrong (but the government believes will
likely do so in the future). The criminal justice system offers plenty of
opportunities for the government to prosecute someone before harm is done
using inchoate and conspiracy crimes. To go beyond those already broad
tools, the circumstances should be highly exceptional, the danger should be
real and imminent, and the net should be cast narrowly. In the case of sex
offender civil commitment, the circumstances are no more dire than for
other serious crimes, the danger is speculative based upon pseudo-science,
and the net is far too broad. Because of these aspects of SVP laws, America
should fundamentally reconsider its approach to fighting sexual violence.
Laws like the federal SVP statute, premised on myths that allocate
substantial resources in a never ending war, do not create a just or better
society.
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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